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A logical empiricist “baseline statement” can formalize some propositions established 
by a body of evidence or set of observations. However, it may not necessarily capture, 
of two propositions it entails, whether all the subsets of the evidence that establish one 
proposition also establish the other, vice versa, or neither. Yet, according to this paper, 
which obtains should sometimes matter for confirmation. It illustrates by showing how 
this “evidential dependence” can be used to address problems with generalizations of 




Hempelian logical empiricist confirmation - as at Hempel 1945, 1965 - has three 
components: 
 
(1) An “empiricist baseline” which is a statement or formal description of what we 
might (or do) know about what exists and some of its properties (and perhaps, in 
certain situations, of what does not exist). 
 
(2) A statement of a hypothesis or several hypotheses ("H"). 
 
(3) A condition or set of conditions identifying which logical relations should hold 
between the empiricist baseline and H such that H is confirmed or disconfirmed. 
 
Hempel’s favoured version of the empiricist baseline was an “observation report” 
referencing a specific object and some of its properties (or a series of such reports, an 
“observation statement”), though he was decidedly non-dogmatic about this (1965, 22-
23). A common alternative is simply for this to be a statement of what the evidence 
establishes about what exists, the difference being between “a is a cow and a is black” 
and “There exists a black cow”. All the arguments of this paper will apply equally to 
either formulation, and for concision I will typically illustrate with the latter, but one 
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could trivially convert all such statements to those indexed on particular objects.  The 
general term “empiricist baseline” is used as a placeholder covering either formulation.  
The core thesis of this paper is that that some of the problems the overall 
approach has faced – notably those associated with Goodman’s New Riddle - are not, 
as is typically assumed, due to (3) but instead due to (1)1. Specifically, the problem is 
that if a set of evidence establishes a particular empiricist baseline that itself entails “P” 
and entails “Q” then it is possible this baseline will not identify whether all sub-sets of 
the extant evidence that establish P also establish Q, vice versa, or neither. 
Confirmation, though, should sometimes be contingent on which obtains.  
Having set out the central idea, the paper illustrates with the grue paradox. It 
argues that the paradox is a problem for formal confirmation principles precisely because 
of a failure to capture these sorts of facts about evidential dependence in a standard empiricist 
baseline. We can however remedy this. Doing so identifies why a green emerald 
observed before some future time T should not normally confirm hypotheses asserting 
grue-like generalizations.  
More broadly, the solution is robust to the multiple versions of grue. It does not 
require assuming a particular predicate pair – green/blue vs grue/bleen – is primitive 
or privileged, nor that one is better entrenched (Goodman 1955), a natural kind (Quine 
1970) or genuine as opposed to “pseudo” (Shoemaker 1980, Bealer 1982, Armstrong 
1985). In addition, the solution can address proposed problematic "emerose" style 
predicates (Godfrey-Smith 2003), and it enjoys advantages over the rival counterfactual 
approaches developed following Jackson (1975, Jackson & Pargetter 1980).  
 
 
2 The empiricist baseline and evidential dependence: a very brief illustration 
 
According to Hempel (1965, p22)  
 “An observation report will be construed as a finite class (or a conjunction of a finite 
number) of observation sentences; and an observation sentence as a sentence which 
either asserts or denies that a given object has a certain observable property (e.g. ‘a 
is a raven’, ‘d is not black’), or that a given sequence of objects stand in a certain 
observable relation (e.g. ‘a is between b and c’).”  
 
The entailments of such a statement are then – via the overall approach – used to 
identify which hypotheses are confirmed or disconfirmed by a confirmation condition. 
The difficulty I want to explore is that such an empiricist baseline statement will not 																																																								
1 The core tool of this paper – evidential dependence – has no special resources, for 
example, to say anything new about the ravens’ paradox. It really is only one subset of 
the challenges that are addressed.  
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necessarily identify whether one entailment is established – that is we accept it – solely 
due to subsets of the overall evidence all of which establish another entailment or not. 
This “evidential dependence” can be roughly intuitively illustrated with the difference 
between the following scenarios (where an object is “a piece of steak-cutlery” if it is a 
knife or a fork but not if it is a spoon): 
 
1. You look in your top-drawer and see a knife and then see a spoon.  
2. You look in your bottom-drawer and see a knife and then see a fork.  
 
In both scenarios we have evidence of what the respective drawer contains and could 
formally describe this with an observation statement; for instance, with reference to the 
top-drawer, “There exists a knife and there exists a spoon”, or “object a exists and a is a 
knife; object b exists and b is a spoon”2. Our description of each scenario will both 
individually entail (with reference to the specific drawer) that “There exists a piece of 
steak-cutlery” and “There exists a knife”. However, with the top-drawer scenario, there 
is a sense in which the conclusion that there exists a piece of steak-cutlery depends on 
the evidence that there exists a knife in a way that is not true of the bottom drawer 
scenario. This is, very roughly, the idea of “evidential dependence”. Of a set of 
evidence, does every subset establishing one conclusion also establish the other? 
In scenario two, for instance, there is a subset of the overall evidence – the 
observation of the fork – that establishes that there exists a piece of steak-cutlery even if 
we were to remove/ignore the evidence establishing that there exists a knife. Hence in 
the bottom-drawer scenario “There exists a piece of steak-cutlery” is not evidentially 
dependent on “There exists a knife”.   
This idea will be set out more precisely subsequently, but one immediate 
complaint sparked by this illustrative example would be: so what? We can capture the 
difference between the scenarios simply by the fact that the observation statement 
referring to the bottom drawer entails “There exists a non-knife piece of steak-cutlery” 
whereas the statement referring to the top drawer does not.  
This is true of most cases: the idea of “evidential dependence” really is normally 
redundant. But it is possible for there to be scenarios where the entailments of a 
statement of what the evidence establishes will not distinguish distinct grounds we 
might have for accepting that statement. These cases have the following logical 
structure. Take any three propositions – P, Q, R - that could be included in a statement 
of what the evidence establishes (or could be entailed by an observation statement) 
whereby: (i) no proposition singularly logically entails any of the others (it is not that 
																																																								
2 Or we could simply include the predicate “being in the top drawer” and add this to 
the referenced object’s properties.  
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P®R etc.); and (ii) (P&Q)®R and (P&R)®Q; and (iii) ((¬P)&R)®¬Q. Take the 
following two different scenarios where each captures all the relevant evidence: 
 
A. We have evidence that P, and we have separate evidence that Q.  
B. We have evidence that P, and we have separate evidence that R.  
 
A standard observation statement of scenario A will be “P&Q”. A similar observation 
statement of scenario B will be “P&R”. These are different evidential scenarios. The 
observation statements, however, are mutual entailments and obviously have identical 
entailments.  It is in principle possible that statements of what a body of evidence 
establishes will not distinguish which of several distinct evidential scenarios obtained: 
in this case, for instance, whether every sub-set of the evidence currently sufficient to 
establish that Q also establishes that P (in scenario A, no; in scenario B, yes).  
One thought might be that this could not hold in practice. This seems false. 
Imagine a farm run by two friends who split the legal ownership of the cows: all male 
black cows and all non-male non-black cows belong to Sarah and are branded as such, 
the rest belong to Karen. Every cow on the farm thus occupies one of the four positions 
of this table: 
 
 Male Not-male 
Black Sarah Not-Sarah 
Not-black Not-Sarah Sarah 
 
Imagine two possible evidential scenarios. In “Scenario1” you walk past a paddock, see 
there is a male cow in it and walking closer see that it is black (you cannot see its 
branding). Because of this evidence you would justifiably conclude it’s a black male 
cow. In “Scenario2” you walk past a paddock, see a male cow in it and see that it is 
Sarah’s (you can’t at this distance identify its colour). As a result of this evidence you 
would justifiably conclude the cow is male and Sarah’s. It is trivial to formally express 
what we know about each scenario in a predicate logic statement. If Cx: x is a cow; Mx: 
x is male; Bx: x is black; Sx: x belongs to Sarah; and where "x[(Sx & Cx)®((Bx & Mx) Ú 
(¬Bx & ¬Mx))]3, then: 
 
Scenario1: $x[Cx & Bx & Mx]  (“There exists a cow that is black and male”) 
Scenario2: $x[Cx & Mx & Sx]  (“There exists a cow that is male and Sarah’s”) 																																																								
3  This last proposition could be understood either as a feature of background 
knowledge, or alternatively as a logical identity, this depending on how the earlier 
definition of ownership is understood. I will assume the latter in what follows, but the 
substance of the argument doesn’t depend upon it.  
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Scenario1 and Scenario2 represent different evidential situations. In Scenario1 you 
have evidence of the cow’s maleness and separate evidence of its blackness, with the 
combination of this evidence necessary to conclude the cow belongs to Sarah. In 
Scenario2 you have evidence of the cow’s maleness and separate evidence that it 
belongs to Sarah, with the combination necessary to conclude it is black. Yet obviously 
as observation statements the conclusions are mutual entailments: $x[Cx & Bx & Mx]  
« $x[Cx & Mx & Sx]. Importantly, in both scenarios the empiricist baseline statement 
will entail both “there exists a black cow” and “there exists a cow belonging to Sarah”. 
But in Scenario1 the evidence for the first was necessary to establish the second. In 
Scenario2 it was not.  
This isn’t a problem in the philosophy of perception, that we see the cow blackly 
but don’t see it “Sarah-ly”, the alleged qualitative distinction perhaps drawing on a 
restricted “adverbial” theory4. Even if this claim about perception is true, this doesn’t 
for instance capture that in Scenario1 the blackness is the separately-evidenced 
predicate, and in Scenario2 it’s not. The idea of separate/non-separate justifying 
evidential sets neither requires nor entails the correctness of a specific theory in the 
philosophy of perception5. 
This difference in scenarios also is not based upon a difference in predicate 
nature or any particular predicate being privileged in principle. What separates these 
scenarios is a contingent fact about the evidence. To illustrate: imagine in Scenario2 you 
then approach the cow and see it is black. Now, by contrast, each predicate is 
separately evidenced, and this is a further different set of evidential relations – even 
though again the observation report will be a mutual entailment of each of the others. 
What we seem to require instead is to identify and capture the presence or 
absence of the following relationship: 
 
Evidential Dependence 6 : Proposition A is currently evidentially dependent on 
proposition B iff there is no sub-set of the evidential set that establishes that A 
without establishing that B, and the overall set establishes that A and that B. 																																																								
4 Such as whereby sometimes “visual experiences are not episodes of sensing sense 
data but are rather episodes of sensing in particular ways” Fish (2010, p36). 
5 Unsurprisingly, as it is orthogonal to arguably the most prominent motivations for 
developing theories of perception, that we want to distinguish between actual 
perception and hallucination, and that we want to know when we are justified in 
believing our perceptions (Smith 2002). 
6 The use of the term “dependence” might suggest to a casual reader that there is some 
intended link to either a dependence logic or Cambridge dependence. There isn’t: these 
are different things responding to different problems with different tools.  
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In other words, is the evidence establishing that B necessary to establish that A or do 
we have some other evidence that does so?  
There are two claims in here perhaps worth immediately flagging as one is 
necessary for the substantive idea to be of use, the other capable of easy amendment. 
The necessary claim is that we can meaningfully think of a set and thus a subset of 
pieces of evidence. This is such an established feature of much of the actual practice of 
scientific endeavor that its rejection would be relatively radical, but there could be 
solipsist views that did so, or indeed one could think of a time-slicing view of 
epistemic agents where one simply knows everything at once without being able to 
recall how one gained knowledge of the propositions. These views would seemingly 
need to be rejected for evidential dependence to both sometimes obtain and be useful.  
The easily amendable claim is that propositions are “established by some pieces 
of evidence”. Different theories of perception might frame this differently, such that it 
is sense-data that establish a proposition, or it is adverbial perceptive engagement that 
does so. Although I have phrased evidential dependence in terms of what the evidence 
establishes this can be rephrased and is not meant to substantively commit one to a 
particular evidentialist theory. So, if desired, one could rephrase the definition of 
evidential dependence and replace the idea of conclusions being established by 
different sets of evidence with that of conclusions being established by different sets of 
sense-data or by different sets of adverbial perceptive engagement or by any or each of 
these in combination with certain non-evidentially justifiably accepted propositions. 
The overall idea really only requires that we be able to distinguish if one premise 
entailed by a baseline empiricist statement is justified by all of the sets of pieces of 
evidence / sense data / adverbial perceptive engagements that are currently sufficient 
to establish a different premise. 
Since it will be subsequently useful to succinctly express evidential dependence 
formally: let Evi(P//Q) be read as “The evidence that P depends on the evidence that 
Q” and hold iff P is currently evidentially dependent on Q. One way this can be 
intuitively verified is by seeing if uncertainty as to our evidence that Q should justify 
uncertainty as to P7.  For an evidential set that establishes that P, let the absence of this 
relationship (non-dependence) be Evi(P¬//Q), where this is read as “The evidence 
that P does not depend on the evidence that Q” and represent that “There is a subset of 
the evidential set that establishes that P but does not establish that Q”. Let Evi(R) be 
“evidence exists that establishes that R”. 																																																								
7 Although a sort of counterfactual uncertainty test is one way to check the dependence 
relationship holds, the relationship does not depend on a counterfactual. It is a fact 
about the relations between the sets of current evidence justifying two conclusions and 
whether one is a sub-set of the other, or neither. 
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As such we can easily express a key evidential difference between the cow scenarios:  
Scenario1: Evi($x[Cx & Sx] // $x[Cx & Mx]) (“The evidence that there exists a 
cow belonging to Sarah depends upon the evidence that there exists a cow that is 
male”) 
Scenario2: Evi($x[Cx & Sx] ¬// $x[Cx & Mx]) (“The evidence that there exists a 
cow belonging to Sarah does not depend upon the evidence that there exists a 
cow that is male.) 
 
The cow-based illustrative example is somewhat contrived, tellingly. Usually we 
naturally describe evidential scenarios using evidential facts that are independent, so 
that observation reports are normally phrased most simply as a series of separately 
evidenced claims. But nothing in propositional logic determines this need be the case, 
and it’s possible to create hypotheses that inappropriately co-join independently-
evidenced facts. This is exactly what happens with generalizations of grue-like 
predicates. 
 
3 “Problematic” predicates and confirmation 
3.1 A basic case 
Consider the following very simple condition drawing somewhat upon Hempel8. 
 
(neo) Hempelian Confirmation Condition 1 (HCC1): 
E confirms H - where H is "x(Fx®Gx) - if: 
(i) E and H are co-possible; 
(ii) E®$x[Fx & Gx] 
 
And following Goodman 1946, 1955 (where “<T” represents “exists before T”, “>T” 
represents “exists at or after T”, and T is some specified future date). 
 
x is green1 iff (x is green & <T) or (x is green & >T).  
x is grue1 iff (x is green & <T) or (x is blue & >T) 
 
The observation statement that “there exists a green emerald before T” (“$x[emerald(x) 
& <T(x) & green(x)]”) would under HCC1 confirm both “("x(emeraldx®grue1x)” (All 
																																																								
8  This encapsulates Nicod’s Condition but with an expansion to cover bodies of 
evidence, one possible variant of Hempel’s “satisfaction criterion of confirmation” (see 
Hempel 1965, p37). I do not mean to imply that he was committed to this: it is however 
recognizably neo-Hempelian.  
	 8	
emeralds are grue1) and “"x(emeraldx®green1x)” (All emeralds are green1). This is 
the – famous - problem.  
If we think of this in terms of evidential dependence, however, then it’s possible 
to see how “"x(emeraldx®grue1x)” has taken two evidentially independent facts – 
that there is a green emerald and that it is before T - and made their co-presence 
necessary to having the hypothesis confirmed. After all, we have evidence that 
establishes the emerald’s existence and appearance (we see it, think we are not visually 
deceived etc.). And we have separate evidence that allows us to conclude it is before T 
(we see the calendar, we don’t think we have been asleep for a few decades or subject 
to time travel etc.). Expressed as an observation statement it is not possible to formally 
identify this as the following logical symmetry holds: $x[emerald(x) & <T(x) & 
grue1(x)] «  $x[emerald(x) & <T(x) & green1(x)]. 
There is a key difference however: the evidence establishing that the emerald 
was observed before time T is currently necessary to establish that it is a grue1 
emerald, the same is not true for establishing it is a green1 emerald. To pick up on this 
difference we can change HCC1 to the following: 
 
(neo) Hempelian Confirmation Condition 2 (HCC2)9: 
E confirms H - where H is "x(Fx®Gx) - if  
1. E and H are co-possible. 
2. E®$x[Fx & Gx]. 
3. For all R such that E®$x[Fx & Gx & Rx] (and where Evi($y[Fy & Gy 
& (¬R)y]) is possible10), then Evi($x[Fx & Gx] ¬// $x[Fx & Rx]). 
 
The underlying idea here is that if we have evidence that an object that is F is both G 
and R, then generalizing that “All F are G” is to implicitly generalize to possible 
instances of Fs that are not-R. If the evidence that the object was R was however 
necessary to conclude it was G then this is ruled out. So if on the 10th of November we 
observe a grey goose and generalize that “All geese are grey” then we are implicitly 
confirming that a goose, if seen a few days later, will be grey. This – under HCC2 – is a 
valid generalization so long as the evidence that it is the 10th of November (our 
observation of our calendar, evidence of its reliability etc.) is not required to conclude it 
																																																								
9 I do not mean to endorse this condition, rather to use it to illustrate how evidential 
dependence can be used to address grue-like problems even in an incredibly simple 
neo-Hempelian framework. 
10 The clause that “Evi($y[Fy & Gy & (¬R)y]) is possible” rules out those cases where G 
logically entails R and also any case where it would be impossible to have evidence of 
something (imagine R is some predicate such as “for which we have evidence”). 
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is a grey goose, even if we do accept it is a grey goose that exists on the 10th of 
November11.   
By contrast, under HCC2, a green emerald observed before T will not confirm 
“All emeralds are grue1” as: 
 
Evi($x[emerald(x) & grue1(x)] // $x[emerald(x) & <T(x)])  “The evidence that an 
emerald that exists was grue1 depends on the evidence that the emerald exists 
before T” 
 
“All emeralds are green1”, by contrast, is confirmed, with the analogous case to above 
being: 
 
Evi($x[emerald(x) & green1(x)] ¬// $x[emerald(x) & <T(x)])  “The evidence that 
an emerald that exists was green1 does not depend on the evidence that it is 
before T” 
 
Note that this resolution does not rely on asserting any difference in principle between 
the status of green1 and grue1 – both are perfectly valid predicates. Nor does it rely on 
any claimed logical asymmetry between the hypotheses and the observation statement 
– every single logical relationship between “All emeralds are green1” and “There exists  
a green1 emerald” holds too between “All emeralds are grue1” and “There exists a 
grue1 emerald”. This is after all the point: the logical relations between the premises 
are identical. It’s the different evidential grounds for accepting the existence statements 
that vary. To accept “There exists a grue1 emerald” you require those bits of evidence 
necessary to establish that it is before T (seeing the clock, the calendar etc.). To accept 
“There exists a green1 emerald” you do not. It is the evidential dependence that is 
different given the evidence we have. 
How then might someone deny this resolution? One option would be to deny 
the meaningfulness or possibility of evidential dependence – whether via solipsist or 
time-slicing theories. Or in principle one could reject the general difference between 
necessary and sufficient conditions (of some evidentially-established premise). I take it 
(almost) no one would want to claim that.  
																																																								
11 Now, obviously, it is trivially easy to invent further evidence that might undermine 
or qualify the conclusion – such as that if someone is going to eat geese near 
Thanksgiving then it’s traditional to eat geese of different colours, so seeing a grey 
goose in November suggests it might have escaped from a mixed-colour geese farm, 
and thus maybe not all geese are grey. This is a secondary question however: the initial 
problem is over what should be concluded absent this further evidence.  
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A different sort of skepticism might try to break the evidential asymmetry 
between green1 and grue1 by claiming that we require the evidence that it is before T – 
such as seeing our watch or the calendar – to know the emerald is green1. The problem 
here is simply that this seems straightforwardly false: even if I was confused about 
what day it was I still have the evidence that the emerald is green1.  
A fourth more promising option seems to be to hold that while the resolution 
gets this case right it might get some other ones wrong. While it’s hard to guard against 
every such possibility, in what follows I run through what have been the most 
historically prominent variations / allied predicates. The resolution is robust to these. 
 
 
3.2 Observed-before-T status 
This result does not depend at all on indexing on time alone (rather than also say 
observational status – the grue paradox comes in multiple variants). Here, for example, 
is what Jackson (1975, p118) has argued is the truly problematic definition: 
 
x is grue2 at t iff (x is examined by T & x is green at t) or (x is not examined by T 
& x is blue at t) 
x is green2 at t iff (x is examined by T & x is green at t) or (x is not examined by T 
& x is green at t).  
 
This reformulation creates no special new problems for HCC2: 
 
Evi($x[emerald(x) & grue2(x)] // $x[emerald(x) & examined by T(x)])  “The 
evidence that an emerald that exists was grue2 is dependent on the evidence that 
the emerald was examined by T” 
 
Evi($x[emerald(x) & green2(x)] ¬// $x[emerald(x) & examined by T(x)])  “The 
evidence that an emerald that exists was green2 is not dependent on the evidence 
that the emerald was examined by T” 
 
3.3 Observed status simpliciter 
Standard treatments of grue index on some time T, differing as to how to do so, either 
that (i) an emerald is grue iff it is green before T or blue at or after T, or alternatively (ii) 
that it is grue iff it is green at t and examined before T or blue at t and not examined 
before T. However, someone might think that an evidential-fact based resolution could 
face difficulties if we index on observation status / examined status simpliciter, without 
referencing time at all. That is: 
 
x is grue3 iff (x is observed & x is green) or (x is not observed & x is blue). 
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x is green3 iff (x is observed & x is green) or (x is not observed & x is green).  
 
The cases here fall into two camps, depending on how “x is observed” is specified. If 
being observed is solely equivalent to there being evidence that the object exists - that 
Evi($x)«observed(x) - then both Evi($x[emerald(x) & grue3(x) & ¬observed(x)]) and 
Evi($x[emerald(x) & green3(x) & ¬observed(x)]) are impossible. If so, “All emeralds 
are grue3” and “All emeralds are green3” would be confirmed by an observed green 
emerald. But this is not a problem. “All emeralds are grue3” would entail that if we 
have any evidence that an emerald exists then we should believe that it is green. If we 
have no evidence that an emerald exists then we should believe that the non-existing 
object is blue (and green). Things that don’t exist would, under this suggestion, 
standardly be both blue and green12.  
Alternatively, assume “x is observed” means something like “x exists and x is 
part of our particular sample”. If so, this case will be analogous to grue1/green1 and 
grue2/green2 (simply swap the respective predicates “<T” and “examined by T” with 
“part of our sample” in the respective evidential fact statements).  
 The term “observed” admits of a certain ambiguity. But it poses no special 
problem so long as we are clear which holds: (i) observed(x)«Evi($x) where x being 
observed simply means having evidence that x exists; or (ii) observed(x)«Evi($xPx) 
where x being observed means having evidence both that x exists and that it has some 
other evidenced property “P” independent of mere existence. 
 
3.4 Bleen and Grue 
The result does not depend at all on privileging green/blue over grue/bleen. Let the 
following hold (where “OT” is a placeholder for any of the variants, “observed by T”, 
“observed at t before T”, “examined before T”, “in our sample” etc...): 
 
x is bleen iff (x is blue & OT) or (x is green & not OT) 
x is grue iff (x is green & OT) or (x is blue & not OT) 
 
Defining green4 and grue 4 solely in grue/bleen terms: 
x is green4 iff (x is grue & OT) or (x is bleen & not OT) 
x is grue4 iff (x is grue & OT) or (x is grue & not OT) 
 
																																																								
12 There are lots of interesting wrinkles here, depending on when and if predicates 
attach to empty names. However, they are not really grue issues and can be defined 
away if desired. Ideally though HCC2 would come with an account of whether the 
predicates it covers require existence.  
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“"x(emeraldx®grue4x)” is not confirmed by the observation of a grue4 emerald that is 
OT,  whereas “"x(emeraldx®green4x)” is confirmed.  
 
Evi($x[emerald(x) & grue4(x)] // $x[emerald(x) & OT(x)])  “The evidence that an 
emerald that exists was grue4 is dependent of the evidence that it was observed 
before T” 
 
Evi($x[emerald(x) & green4(x)] ¬// $x[emerald(x) & OT(x)])  “The evidence that 
an emerald that exists was green4 is not dependent on the evidence that it was 
observed before T” 
 
To establish that the emerald is grue4 (and not bleen and OT) you need the evidence 
establishing that it is OT. Whereas to establish that the emerald is green4 you don’t: the 
evidence of its appearance is sufficient to establish that it’s either (grue and OT) or 
(bleen and not-OT), and as such either way it’s therefore green4.  
 
3.5 Overcoming the problems of the rival counterfactual approach  
An evidential-dependence based solution enjoys advantages over the type of 
approaches first proposed by Jackson whereby an inductive straight rule is only 
applied for instances that meet a “counterfactual condition”. For Jackson (1975, p124), 
this is: 
 
“that the conjunction of certain Fs which are H being G with these Fs being such 
that if they had not been H, they would not have been G, does not support other 
non-H Fs being G”.  
 
What this means in practice is that the inductive projection from a “blah” emerald 
examined before T to the conclusion that other unexamined emeralds are “blah” is 
valid if the following counterfactual holds: that if the emerald hadn’t been examined it 
would still have been “blah”. Jackson (ibid, p124) then argues that we can know this in 
the emerald case with respect to greenness but not grueness (where unexamined 
emeralds are blue): “The emeralds we have examined are green not because they have 
been examined but because of their chemical composition and crystalline structure, 
and so, like most objects in our world, they would have had the colour they do have 
whether or not they had been examined”. His later reformulation with Pargetter 
(Jackson & Pargetter 1980) qualified this slightly, making the counterfactual that if the 
F’s had not been H they would still have been F and G.   
As well as the question of whether such a move really covers all the key cases 
(Chihara 1981), this entire approach relies on the justification of the counter-factual. 
Jackson (1975 p129) tries to pre-empt this concern by arguing that while 
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counterfactuals “raise some of the most difficult problems in philosophy” it still 
remains that “we do, on occasion, know with certainty that certain counterfactuals are 
true, despite the difficulties in analyzing just what it is that we know on such occasions 
and how we know it”.  
The worry, however, isn’t just that a full theory of counterfactuals is difficult, 
it’s that to produce the relevant conclusion – that unexamined emeralds would be 
green and not grue – we have to assume that some things (chemical composition / 
crystalline structure) are projectable in the relevant way, but why this is justified is 
exactly the issue at hand. As Roskies (2008) argues: “the problem with Jackson’s 
solution to the grue paradox is that application of his counterfactual condition requires 
appeal to knowledge that application of the condition is supposed to justify. This is a 
pernicious form of circularity, in the absence of independent arguments to shore up 
our intuitions that greenness with respect to observation is counterfactually robust 
whereas grueness is not”13.  
By contrast, a resolution relying on evidential dependence doesn’t depend on 
any theory of counter-factual non-examination at all: it simply depends on the 
structure of the set of evidence we have. Whatever you think about what might have 
been, there is a fact of the matter as to whether, of any particular set of evidence, there’s a 
subset that justifies that P but doesn’t justify that Q, in cases where the overall set of evidence 
justifies both propositions.  
Really all the evidential-dependence based approach requires is that pieces of 
evidence can be independent of each other, in the sense that it’s possible to 
meaningfully think of a sub-set of a set of evidence (or a sub-set of sense-data or of 
adverbial engagements, depending on one’s theory of evidence/perception). There’s 
no need to appeal to what might have been had history been relevantly different and 
various objects not been observed.  
 
3.6 Emerose cases 
A prominent further proposed problem for counterfactual accounts is that of 
“emerose” predicates, such as in Godfrey-Smith (2003): 
 
emerose1: An object is emerose1 iff (an emerald at t & observed by T) or (a rose at t 
& not-observed by T)14.  																																																								
13 A recent attempt to overcome these difficulties is Schramm 2014, and for a careful 
reworking of the relevant worries to apply to this effort see Dorst 2016. 
14 Godfrey-Smith uses the symbol “O” to represent Jackson’s “at t and observed by T” 
as well as other formulations “in our sample” etc. However, as this admits of being 
interpreted as “observed” simpliciter, absent time reference, the more precise 
formulation is included here (and on observation simpliciter see the earlier discussion) 
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emerose2: An object is emerose2 iff (an emerald) or (a rose at t & not-observed by 
T).  
 
The difficulty for counterfactual approaches is that “All emerose1 are green” appears 
confirmed by an observed by T green emerald even with a counterfactual condition, 
namely that had the emerose1 not been observed it would have still been green at t15. 
In the second case, the counterfactual is that had the emerose2 not been observed it 
would have still been emerose2 and green, so “All emerose2 are green” is once again 
confirmed by a green emerald.  
The HCC2 by contrast deals with these straightforwardly. “All emerose1 are 
green” is not confirmed by an emerose1 that is green (i.e. an observed by T green 
emerald) because the evidence that it is a green emerose1 depends on the evidence that 
it is an emerose1 observed by T (without the evidence that it is observed before T you 
wouldn’t have sufficient evidence to conclude it was emerose1). That is: 
 
Evi($x[emerose1(x) & green(x)] // $x[emerose1(x) & observed by T(x)]) 
 
With emerose2, the hypothesis “All emerose2 are green” is not confirmed by a green 
emerose2 (a green emerald) because the evidence that it is an emerose2 that is green 
depends on the evidence that it is a green emerald.  
 
Evi($x[emerose2(x) & green(x)] // $x[green(x) & emerald(x)]) 
 
Because it is perfectly possible to have evidence of a green emerose2 that is not a green 
emerald, the evidential dependence rules out the generalization16.  
 
4. Why is this the right approach? 
																																																								
15 As noted, Jackson (along with Pargetter’s, 1980) reformulation of the earlier proposal  
does overcome emerose1-like cases, but hence emerose2 in Godfrey-Smith (2003).  
16 In the extant literature, having “All emerose2 are green” confirmed by a green 
emerald is taken as self-evidently a bad-confirmation, so the HCC2 provides what 
most people will regard as the right result. I’m personally not sure if confirmation here 
is quite so straightforwardly problematic. There is a case that a non-rose should leave 
us skeptical about the existence of roses, thus the confirmation should depend on 
whether the body of evidence contains any non-green roses. However, in the context of 
grue-style problems the overall point remains: that simply encoding evidential 
dependence provides the resources to easily distinguish grue/emerose cases from 
green/emerald like ones. 
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That this result is possible and gets the cases “correct” is clearly significant, though the 
ingenuity of coining emeroses suggests that the HCC2 might need future revision to 
deal with an as yet not suggested case.  
The general approach though has certain advantages over rivals, advantages 
that are likely to endure, and those that draw upon an underlying logic. Firstly, it 
doesn’t need us to establish that any predicate is in principle projectable, with all the 
associated worries that we have simply defined things to get the intuitive outcomes.  
Secondly, it does not rely – as per the counterfactual approach – on us 
establishing what things would have been like had the relevant object not been 
observed, with the attendant worry that we again have assumed what is meant to be 
established. There is a fact of the matter as to whether one of two evidential sets is a 
subset of the other or not, and it requires no appeal to what might have been.  
Thirdly, it does not rely – as per Godfrey Smith’s (2003) reframing of the 
problem as similar to that of cofounding variables – on establishing a causal relation or 
its absence (so that we try to establish whether the object’s being observed caused its 
greenness). All the solution of this paper relies upon is the structure of the evidence 
and that alone. We need no background assumptions about causal relationships for the 
same reason we need no appeal to counterfactuals: the evidence tells us when a 
predicate is projectable or not. 
This result also, however, seems to make sense for the right reasons, and 
further may hint at a broader justification. When we inductively generalize from 
evidence of a type of object having a particular predicate to all such objects we 
generalize to objects that have different features. If we see a green emerald on a 
Thursday and use this to confirm “All emeralds are green” then we have implicitly 
generalized to other green emeralds that might be seen on a Friday. This wouldn’t be 
justified if the evidence establishing that it was Thursday was a necessary part of the 
extant evidence sufficient to establish that there’s a green emerald.  
This is what grue-like generalizations get wrong.  Any set of extant evidence 
establishing that the emerald is grue has to contain the evidence to establish it is 
“before T” (or “observed at t before T” or whatever relevantly distinguishes grueness 
from greenness-unrestricted). And thus generalizing to situations where this evidence 
wouldn’t obtain – after T – is illegitimate (as long as other instances exist, as Jackson 
echoing Goodman always emphasized).  
The underlying idea here is that our overall inductive generalizations should 
track the underlying structure of the logical relations between the justifying evidence. 
An instance of predicate P that also is predicate Q should be projectable to other 
potential instances with predicate not-Q iff the evidence that the instance was Q was 
not necessary to concluding that it was P. It is the contingent structure of the current 
evidential set that is necessary to identify this, not the logical relations between the 
predicates themselves.  
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A baseline statement of what a body of evidence establishes is not necessarily 
rich enough to capture all the relevant relations within the evidential set. This creates 
problems with ruling out the generalizing of predicates – such as grue - where one 
independently-evidenced fact is made inappropriately contingent upon another. These 
difficulties can potentially be overcome by formally encoding evidential dependence.  
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